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I. Introduction 
I have been invited to address any topic relating to emerging issues in international 
humanitarian law (IHL). When considering which subject to address, I decided to avoid a 
specific IHL topic, some of which are being addressed in depth during this symposium, but 
rather to take a step back and consider some of the more fundamental challenges that IHL is 
now facing. 
The most pressing challenge, in my opinion, is the trend of IHL being misused to justify 
killings which are of dubious legality under the law relating to the use of inter-State force. 
The purpose of IHL is supposed to be to prevent avoidable death and destruction, not the 
reverse. I am thinking here primarily of the rise in targeted killings abroad of non-State 
actors, on the basis that these are justified as attacks on fighters in a non-international 
armed conflict. Such attacks have been facilitated by the increased availability of armed 
drones. It needs to be remembered that any practice that is acquiesced in by the international 
community can then easily be undertaken by other countries against targets that they 
perceive as threats. Furthermore, this trend is straining further the two classical IHL 
categories, into which various activities, such as U.N. operations and mixed conflicts, do not 
easily fit. There needs to be a serious reconsideration of whether it is possible to speak of 
“rules of armed conflict” without first classifying the violence as international or non-
international. 
The other topic I wish to address is a development which invites IHL specialists to 
seriously rethink the reasons why so many IHL rules are violated. Recent findings by human 
rights procedures have illustrated that a culture of human rights violations leads to serious 
humanitarian law violations. This has been indisputably proved in the area of violence 
against women. I am convinced that the same is the case for many other rules of IHL. 
These two seemingly unrelated topics have one point in common: the separation of IHL 
from other bodies of law, although technically accurate, can be an illusion in reality. The non-
respect of other branches of international law can, and increasingly does, have a direct 
negative effect on a genuine respect of the purpose and spirit of IHL. Several branches of 
international law are important to achieve what IHL is intended to do, for example, certain 
aspects of environmental law, air law or cultural property law. However, for the purpose of 
this presentation, I will limit my comments to the law regulating inter-State force and human 
rights law. 
II. Perverse Effect on IHL by the Non-Respect of the Rules 
Limiting Inter-State Force 
A. Unrealistic Expectations That IHL Can Compensate for Violations 
of the U.N. Charter 
Everyone is aware of the degree to which Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter has been 
disrespected. With a few exceptions, such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and Indonesia’s 
invasion of East Timor, invading nations have for the most part gotten away with their 
aggression. Some have had to retreat due to military confrontation by the invaded nation, 
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such as Russia in Afghanistan and Argentina in the Falklands, but for the most part wars 
have increasingly come to be seen as “inevitable,” even by international lawyers. It is my 
theory, which I cannot prove, that the progressive disrespect of the rules prohibiting force in 
the U.N. Charter has led to an increased acceptance by many nations, and other groups, of 
the use of force. The difficulty with which the crime of aggression was included in the Statute 
of the International Criminal Court is evidence to this effect.1 A serious low point, as far as 
the behavior of western nations is concerned, was the bombardment of Kosovo in 1999 by 
NATO without a self-defense justification and without even a semblance of trying to get 
United Nations’ advance approval. Such a mentality helped pave the way for the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, which was an egregious violation of the U.N. Charter.2 
All of this has concentrated attention on the rules of IHL. I, like many others, have worked 
hard to make these rules known, and helped their modernization to match developments in 
technology and new practices. However, IHL was never meant to solve political and social 
problems. The respect of its rules will not prevent the death, destruction, suffering, and long-
term misery, economic and otherwise, that armed conflict inevitably entails. Concentrating 
on IHL as the principal means to alleviate violence and horror is a major mistake, as this is to 
expect too much of what IHL can do. The decision made by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) in the late 1980s to educate the general public in at least one 
fundamental rule of IHL, namely, that civilians are not to be targeted, at least had the effect 
of newspapers reporting on this issue and human rights groups actively denouncing 
violations of IHL.3 I was very much involved in encouraging this development. However, the 
result is that many people now have the idea that any civilian casualties must mean that 
violations have occurred—which we know is not the case. Indeed, even in the case of the 
intervention in Libya, further to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 in 2011, dozens of 
civilian casualties have been reported, even though the purpose of the mandate was to protect 
civilians.4 It should have been obvious to anyone that, even with the best of care, an air 
campaign was bound to result in civilian casualties, as military activity was likely to occur 
near or in urban environments. Also, as the journalist David Rieff comments: “War, even 
                                                                                                                               
 1. As a member of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Delegation to the Rome 
Conference in 1998, I experienced the difficulties involved firsthand. However, it has been described 
by other authors, e.g., Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161, 170–71 
(2008).  
 2. Justifications based on prior U.N. Security Council resolutions do not stand up to scrutiny. See S.C. 
Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002) (not authorizing the use of force); S.C. Res. 678, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (which only authorized the use of force to remove Iraq from 
Kuwait); S.C. Res. 687, ¶¶ 12, 22, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 8, 1991) (adopted after Kuwait was 
liberated and insisting that Iraq abandon all weapons of mass destruction; the only consequence, if 
this was not undertaken, was that the economic sanctions against Iraq would not be lifted). 
Furthermore, the preamble to S.C. Res. 687 “[a]ffirm[ed] the commitment of all Member States to 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of . . . Iraq.” Id. pmbl. ¶ 2. 
 3. Since the 1990s, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have regularly written reports 
on the respect or otherwise of international humanitarian law. See, e.g., CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE 
PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW (Roy Gutman & David Rieff, eds., 1999). 
 4. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). On civilian casualties, see C. J. Chivers 
& Eric Schmitt, In Strikes on Libya by NATO, an Unspoken Civilian Toll, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/world/africa/scores-of-unintended-casualties-in-nato-war-
in-libya.html. 
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when it is waged for a just cause and with scrupulous respect for international humanitarian 
law, always involves a descent into barbarism (think of the way Qaddafi died).”5 With the 
possible exception of the short Falklands War in 1982, it is difficult to think of an exception to 
this observation. 
In other words, IHL cannot take the place of the original intention of the U.N. Charter, 
which was to prohibit the use of armed force against other nations. The purpose of the self-
defense exception in Article 51 was to allow an invaded nation (inevitably, illegally invaded) 
to defend itself until the Security Council took over using Chapter VII. The blockage in the 
Security Council until 1989 prevented this,6 but the end of this state of affairs should have 
enabled the original purpose of the United Nations to be implemented. As the preamble to the 
U.N. Charter makes clear, in order “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” 
it is necessary “to practice tolerance,” to ensure that “armed forces shall not be used, save in 
the common interest” and, most importantly, to “employ international machinery for the 
promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.”7 Although some efforts 
have been made to this effect, the logic of power politics has still held sway. 
The ongoing result is the continued use of force by governments, non-State groups and 
criminals (whether labeled terrorists or not) and the perception that this is the way to solve 
problems. It is not. Armed force is very good at capturing or recapturing territory, or repelling 
an armed attack, but, in my opinion, that is all. IHL rules are logical and effective for the 
purpose of capturing territory efficiently with the least possible destruction and loss of life. 
The rules were developed against such a background and still make perfect sense in that 
context. However, it needs to be properly questioned whether killing members of terrorist 
groups will actually make that terrorism go away.8 Certainly it was not the use of force in 
Northern Ireland that finally solved the problem of resentment and associated violence, but 
rather the very difficult process of achieving sufficient mutual understanding between the 
groups to agree to a genuine peace process. 
It is against this background that I am voicing serious concern about the process by which 
violations of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter have been justified by using IHL. Targeted 
killings against suspected terrorists abroad have been justified on the basis that there is an 
armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associated groups. As such, their members are to be seen as 
fighters that can be targeted. As these groups do not represent a State, and there is 
                                                                                                                               
 5. David Rieff, Op-Ed., R2P, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html (commenting on the negative effect of 
using force under the “Responsibility to Protect” banner, using the intervention in Libya as an 
example). 
6. The effect of the Cold War was to prevent the adoption of many resolutions by the U.N. Security 
Council, largely, although not entirely, due to vetoes by the USSR. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
and the dissolution of the USSR, the Security Council began to adopt numerous resolutions, but, 
with the exception of Resolution 678 in 1990, none took action further to an act of aggression. 
Weisbord, supra note 1, at 169.  
 7. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 8. The result can indeed be the reverse. See comments to this effect in two articles published in the 
International Herald Tribune on April 15, 2010: Mark Medish & Joel McCleary, Op-Ed., 
Assassination Season Is Open, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 15, 2010; Robert Wright, Op-Ed., The High 
Cost of Political Killing, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 15, 2010. 
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understandably no intention of according prisoner of war (POW) status to any that might be 
captured, the conflict has been classified as a non-international one. This justification is an 
abuse of IHL. In fact it is the very acceptance of such use of force on another State’s territory 
as a non-international conflict that I consider to be a major mistake. Common Article 3 
(Article 3) of the four Geneva Conventions was motivated by the desire to introduce basic IHL 
rules to protect persons not, or no longer, taking part in hostilities during civil wars.9 This is 
abundantly clear not only from the wording of that article,10 but also from the commentary to 
this provision. The discussion of delegates during the negotiation of this article spoke 
exclusively of insurgents resisting the incumbent government inside a single State.11 
Furthermore, the rules within the article refer exclusively to the protection of those in the 
hands of the other party to the conflict, including an obligation to collect and care for the sick 
and wounded. Targeting someone in another country through the exclusive use of drones or 
other air power makes it automatically impossible to respect these provisions. Article 3 was 
clearly never meant to apply to such a situation.  
Although this point is relevant for any cross-border operations using air power, there is a 
greater danger now that the acquisition of drones has increased exponentially. Even Iran has 
just shown off its first domestically-built armed drone with a range of 620 miles.12 Although 
the argument in favor of drones is that the operators can take more care on accurate 
targeting than a stressed pilot,13 there is also no doubt that drones could create a huge 
temptation for many States to use force against targets in other countries.14 Their own 
armies would not be put at risk. As they are manipulated through a computer, it would not 
necessarily be evident where the attack originated (unless drones display the national flag as 
aircraft are required to do under customary rules). In fact, we are on the edge of what could 
be a descent into a nightmare if firm measures are not taken to insist on the importance of 
the prohibition of the use of force. Insisting that such cross-border activities are not non-
international actions needs to be part of this effort. 
                                                                                                                               
9.  See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. 
10. The article states: “In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties . . . .” Id. 
 11. See, e.g., ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 49–50 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 
1952); ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AT SEA 33 
(Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960); ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 35–37 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 
1960) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION III]; ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA 
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 35–36 (Jean S. 
Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958). Extending the interpretation to include 
non-governmental forces fighting each other within a State does not undermine either the language 
of the provision or its main intention and is therefore acceptable. 
 12. Iran Unveils First Bomber Drone, BBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-11052023. 
 13. See, e.g., Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 409, 431–33 (2009). 
 14. Id. at 443. 
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B. Re-Interpretation of “Non-International Conflict” as a Result of the 
Deterioration of the Rules Prohibiting the Use of Force 
The approach that seems to have been adopted in recent years is to classify any conflict 
that is not inter-governmental as non-international. I can see the semantic logic of this, but it 
is not the intention of Article 3. Kenneth Anderson dates the abusive use of Article 3 to the 
judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Hamdan case, which applied this article to the 
treatment of Guantanamo detainees, thereby implying that it can apply to “a borderless 
terrorist group.”15 As Anderson says in that article, it would have simply been better to insist 
on the application of minimum standards. In 1949, Article 3 provided the only binding legal 
standards for the protection of detained persons, whereas now, human rights law and more 
recent treaty and customary IHL are the relevant sources. The other reason why Article 3 is 
not the proper source is the standard required for that article to apply, namely, the 
organization of rebel forces and the intensity of fighting.16 The intensity criterion is not 
normally met with most terrorist attacks. As the commentary to Article 3 says: “it must be 
recognized that the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with armed forces on 
either side engaged in hostilities—conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an 
international war, but take place within the confines of a single country.”17 
The misuse of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions has been made possible by the 
dangerous deterioration of the interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter. The 
purpose of separating the jus ad bellum from the jus in bello was to ensure that invaded 
nations could not argue that, as they had been the victim of aggression, IHL should not apply 
to them. As the ICRC needs to remain neutral as to which party is responsible for an 
aggression, it avoids addressing the jus ad bellum. However, it is a mistake for other 
international lawyers to treat IHL as totally divorced from the effects of how force is used and 
the justification given for it. Non-ICRC personnel may, and indeed should, publicly comment 
on whether such justifications are acceptable. 
If we are to avoid a world of increased anarchy, violence and chaos, it is important to 
understand how we have reached a situation where many States seem to be accepting, or at 
least not vociferously objecting to, the killing of hundreds (maybe thousands) of people on 
another continent, supposedly in the absence of an international armed conflict. As 
commented on by John Bellinger III: “For several years, U.S. allies have made no public 
comment even as U.S. drone strikes have killed twice as many suspected al-Qaeda and 
Taliban members than were ever imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay.”18 
                                                                                                                               
 15. Kenneth Anderson, More Predator Drone Debate, in the Wall Street Journal, and What the Obama 
Administration Should Do as a Public Legal Position, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 9, 2010), 
http://www.volokh.com/2010/01/09/more-predator-drone-debate-in-the-wall-street-journal-and-what-
the-obama-administration-should-do-as-a-public-legal-position/. 
 16. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 37–60 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Apr. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/080403.pdf (discussing the definition of a non-
international armed conflict). 
 17. COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 11, at 37. 
 18. John B. Bellinger III, Will Drone Strikes Become Obama’s Guantanamo?, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/will-drone-strikes-become-obamas-guantanamo/2011 
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The trend towards a regression from the standards in the U.N. Charter has been well 
described by Christian Tams, in his article entitled The Use of Force against Terrorists, 
published in the European Journal of International Law.19 This article describes the fact that 
until the end of the 1980s it was the accepted view of the vast majority of States,20 supported 
by the International Court of Justice,21 that the interpretation of Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter was to be interpreted restrictively. In this regard, there is a deliberate difference 
between the words “any use of force” in Article 2(4) and “armed attack” in Article 51. The 
term “armed attack” in that article had to be one undertaken by a State directly. If 
undertaken by a non-State actor, it had to be attributable to another State, i.e., effectively 
controlled by it.22 Additionally, the International Court of Justice stressed in the Nicaragua 
case (1986) and the more recent Oil Platforms case (2003), that attacks would need to reach a 
certain threshold of violence in order to trigger the right of self-defense.23 This means, 
therefore, that for the vast majority of terrorist activity, the use of force could not be justified 
by the doctrine of self-defense. This was the view of the vast majority of States also, despite 
the fact that they had been at the receiving end of terrorism for decades. Counter-terrorism 
treaties concentrated on cooperation in criminal prosecution and other non-forcible measures, 
as the majority of States feared that allowing the use of force against terrorists would 
inevitably “invite abuse.”24 
With regard to the position in the present day, States still refer to self-defense as the 
justification for the use of force against terrorists, and the International Court of Justice has 
not changed its opinion on the meaning. However, since the 1990s, States seem less keen to 
criticize an attack against non-State actors abroad. In his article, Tams referred not only to 
the general acceptance of the use of force against Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks,25 
but also to the lack of criticism to the practice of resorting to the use of force against certain 
                                                                                                                               
 /09/30/gIQA0ReIGL_story.html. John Bellinger III was a legal adviser for the U.S. State 
Department from 2005 to 2009 and at the time of writing the article he was an adjunct senior fellow 
at the Council on Foreign Relations. The statement, therefore, cannot be in the nature of a mere 
allegation. 
 19. Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 359 (2009). 
 20. Id. at 363 (citing G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. Doc. A/RES/20/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965); G.A. Res 25/2625, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970); G.A. Res. 29/3314, U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3314; and G.A. Res. 
42/22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/22 (Nov. 18, 1987)). See also id. at 367 (pointing out that attempts by a 
few States to use self-defense to justify attacks on terrorists in another country were always rejected 
by the international community). 
 21. Id. at 363 (citing, in particular, the landmark ICJ rulings, Corfu Channel (1949) and Nicaragua 
(1986)).  
 22. Id. at 368–69. 
 23. Id. at 387. 
 24. Id. at 373. 
 25. Serious concern about the unilateral use of force against non-State actors abroad was already voiced 
by Antonio Cassese in 2001. Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal 
Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 996–97 (2001). He pointed out, in 
particular, that Security Council Resolution 1638, adopted shortly after the attacks of 9/11, was 
“ambiguous and contradictory” because although the preamble referred to the right of self-defense, 
operative paragraph 1 referred only to a “threat to peace” and not an “armed attack.” Id. The 
seeming acceptance of unilateral action without a Security Council authorization meant that States 
assimilated “a terrorist attack by a terrorist organization to an armed aggression by a state, 
entitling the victim state to resort to self-defence.” Id. at 997.  
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groups in a number of other cases, e.g., by Turkey against the PKK in Iraq, by Russia against 
Chechen bases in Georgia, etc.26 He noted that many of these actions were more in the nature 
of reprisals or self-help than traditional concepts of self-defense. Furthermore a lot of the 
attacks by terrorists could not be said to have been controlled by the State they were based in. 
Tams suggested, therefore, that a better way to understand contemporary State practice is to 
recognize that the level of attribution required has changed from one of control to one of 
“complicity in the activities of terrorists based on its territory;” in other words, a form of 
“aiding and abetting” the terrorists’ conduct.27 He was of the view that this development had 
occurred because of the international community’s determination to fight terrorism, but at 
the same time he recognized the risk of abuse. In particular, if in the future States were to 
generally accept an accumulation of small attacks as a basis for the use of self-defense, this 
would undermine “the temporal dimension of self-defence and risk[] turning a temporal right 
into an open-ended licence to use force.”28 He did not think that this had yet occurred but that 
there was a risk that it could. In his article, Tams hoped, therefore, that Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan, “which has turned into a self-perpetuating military campaign 
serving a range of objectives . . . will remain an isolated deviation from the general rule.”29 
Tams’ article was published in 2009. It is evident that the “deviation” described by Tams 
was not temporary, at least not in the light of the targeted killing policy of the present U.S. 
administration. The rationale for the policy is described by John Bellinger III in the following 
manner: 
 The United States . . . believes that drone strikes are permitted under international 
law and the United Nations Charter as actions in self-defense, either with the consent 
of the country where the strike takes place or because that country is unwilling or 
unable to act against an imminent threat to the United States. . . . 
 Obama administration officials have explained . . . that strikes against particular 
militant leaders are permissible, either because the individuals are part of the overall 
U.S. conflict with al-Qaeda or because they pose imminent threats to the United 
States.30 
He adds, however, that: 
No other government has said publicly that it agrees with the U.S. policy or legal 
rationale for drones. European allies, who vigorously criticized the Bush administration 
for asserting the unilateral right to use force against terrorists in countries outside 
Afghanistan, have neither supported nor criticized reported U.S. drone strikes in 
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Instead, they have largely looked the other way . . . .31 
                                                                                                                               
 26. Tams, supra note 19, at 378–81. Other examples include force by Colombia against members of the 
FARC in Ecuador, and by Rwanda, Tajikistan and Burma, who responded to cross-border attacks by 
rebels by moving their troops into neighboring States, and by Israel against Hezbollah in Lebanon. 
Id. Criticism of Israel’s action in 2006 concentrated on its disproportionate use of force, rather than 
the decision to resort to the use of force. Id. at 379. 
 27. Id. at 385–86. 
 28. Id. at 389. 
 29. Id. at 390. 
 30. John B. Bellinger III, Obama’s Drone Danger, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2011, at A17. 
 31. Id. 
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It is my theory that one of the major reasons why the rules prohibiting recourse to the use 
of force have been allowed to lapse to such a degree is that there are no significant non-
governmental organizations dedicated to criticizing violations. There can be no doubt that the 
amount of attention to international human rights law and to IHL is thanks to the efforts of 
such organizations. However, most human rights organizations do not address the issue of 
the validity of any particular inter-state force under the rules of the U.N. Charter, for reasons 
that do not seem particularly convincing to me.32 
Various elements are relevant to this situation: is the justification given by the U.S. 
government a reflection of present law? Should it be in the light of the potential implications? 
What is its effect as far as IHL is concerned? 
C. Evaluation of the Stated Rationale for Attacks on Individuals 
Abroad 
An increased acquiescence to such strikes on non-State actors, including individuals, in 
another State’s territory could in due course adjust customary law to allow for them. The 
actual legal rationale, however, remains unclear.33 
Attacks with the consent of the government may, at first sight, seem a reasonable 
justification, but there are two potential problems. The first is that a State has human rights 
obligations toward those within its jurisdiction and normally extra-judicial executions are a 
violation of the right to life.34 Only if a person is a threat to life and it is impossible to arrest 
him or her before that person takes another life, is lethal force permissible.35 Asking or 
allowing another State to attack such a person outside such a situation is a violation of the 
asking State’s human rights obligations, and the attacking State is complicit in that violation. 
It may be argued that the situation would be different if the State in which the attack is to 
take place is in a non-international armed conflict and the person concerned is one of the 
insurgent fighters. From an IHL point of view, this would not be problematic as such, but it 
could amount to unlawful interference in the internal affairs of another State. In an article I 
wrote some time ago for the British Yearbook of International Law, I argued that if a 
government is in difficulty because of an insurrection, it may not lawfully call on another 
State to aid it.36 This conclusion was based on the fact that all governments that requested 
                                                                                                                               
 32. The International Commission of Jurists (of which I was Secretary-General at the time) was one of 
the very few organizations that published a view that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was illegal. I 
consider it also appropriate that Philip Alston, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary, or arbitrary executions, also addressed the issue of the use of inter-State force in his 
study on targeted killings. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Study on Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 34–45, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 
28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Study on Targeted Killings].  
 33. See NILZ MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51–55 (2008) (summarizing various 
explanations and the difficulties associated with them). 
 34. Extra-judicial executions are an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to all the major human rights 
treaties. For a description, including during times of conflict, see LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN TIMES OF CONFLICT AND TERRORISM ch.6 (2011). 
 35. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G.A. Res. 34/169, Annex at art. 3, cmt (c), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979). 
 36. Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 
1985 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 189. 
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outside help justified the request on the basis of self-defense, alleging that the rebels were 
encouraged and helped by another State.37 If a government no longer has control of a State 
because of a serious insurrection, it should no longer be seen as the sole representative of that 
State.38 
The second basis articulated for such attacks is that the State in which the non-State actor 
is based is “unable or unwilling” to stop the threat to another State. This ground seems to be 
accepted by some commentators, albeit within strict limits.39 Cassese, for example, pointed 
out that the network of cells making up al-Qaeda was based in about sixty States. These 
individuals were therefore involved, in one form or another, in aiding or abetting the attacks 
of 9/11. It could hardly be accepted that all the countries in which these individuals operated 
could be subject to attack, not without risking a third world war. He suggested, therefore, 
limiting any action in self-defense to an attack on terrorist headquarters, which in this case 
was considered to be in Afghanistan. Further he stressed the need to bring alleged terrorists 
to justice as well as to go beyond repressive measures. He pointed out that the long-term 
perspective has to address social inequalities, poverty, ignorance and other endemic problems 
that lie at the root of terrorism.40 This point has been recognized by the U.N. Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy which includes “measures to address the conditions conducive to the 
spread of terrorism.”41 
D. Reasons to Maintain the Traditional Post-Charter Interpretation of 
Self-Defense 
There are a number of reasons why drone attacks against individuals are a problem from 
both a legal and practical point of view. First, the covert nature of drone attacks means that it 
is probably impossible to evaluate the validity of intelligence information that underpinned 
the decision to use force. The likelihood of mistakes is high.42 
                                                                                                                               
37.  I have not seen any change in State practice in this regard. 
 38. Ian Brownlie, writing in 1960, was already of the view that such justification was dubious: he 
considered that a government giving support to a beleaguered regime was objectionable because of 
the principles of self-determination and non-interference in internal affairs, and because of the 
danger of making an internal armed conflict an international one. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 327 (1963) (incorporating this idea from Brownlie’s 1960 
thesis). 
 39. See, e.g., Study on Targeted Killing, supra note 32, ¶¶ 35–41; Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Principles of 
International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence princ. 6 (Chatham House, Working 
Paper No. 05/01, 2005) [hereinafter Chatham House Principles], available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108106. The Chatham House Principles 
were the result of a study to provide a statement on the rules of international law governing the use 
of force in self-defense. The participants were present and former principal legal advisers to the U.K. 
Foreign Office as well as leading British specialists in international law. 
 40. Cassese, supra note 25, at 999–1001. 
 41. G.A. Res. 60/288, Annex at I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 8, 2006). 
 42. One needs only to consider the number of persons held in Guantanamo who turned out to be 
innocent. As another example, in July 2005 British police thought they were killing a suicide 
bomber in London; the victim was an innocent Brazilian electrician. 
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Secondly, given that IHL governing international conflicts should apply, attacks have to be 
limited to military objectives, to combatants (if any)43 and to persons taking a direct part in 
hostilities (which would probably be the terrorists here). Notwithstanding the Interpretative 
Guidance of the ICRC on the term “Direct Participation in Hostilities,” this still allows a 
degree of latitude in its practical application. 
Third, although it may be argued that such attacks are discrete events and aimed at 
dangerous individuals, their effects should not be underestimated. There appears to be no 
clear indication of how many innocent persons are killed or injured in these attacks or how 
proportionality is assessed in advance. Additionally, many people suspected of giving 
information to those responsible for such attacks are murdered, as they are considered to be 
collaborators by members of the local population.44 This should not come as a surprise; it is 
indeed to be expected.  
Fourth, if a departure is made from the strict interpretation of “armed attack,” then quite 
a range of persons could be seen as targetable by some States. Many States, unfortunately, 
define “terrorism” in quite a lax way as covering anyone who disagrees with State policy.45 
Several regional treaties are frighteningly lax in their interpretation of “terrorism.”46 The 
argument that people demanding change are being supported from abroad remains 
common—it is not beyond imagination that persons based abroad encouraging democratic 
change could be seen as a valid target. 
At the other end, civilians that are firing the drones are most certainly taking a “direct 
part in hostilities,” and are therefore valid targets under IHL. This further weakens the 
distinction between combatants and civilians. A rather radical way around this problem is 
suggested by Kenneth Anderson. After having correctly noted that attacks on al-Qaeda 
abroad cannot be classified as a non-international armed conflict, he proposes avoiding IHL 
altogether by returning to traditional notions of self-defense. As he puts it: “Self-defense gives 
the discretionary ability to attack anywhere in the world where a target is located, without 
having to make claims about a state of armed conflict everywhere and always across the 
world.”47 
This would mean that military action in self-defense against terrorist groups would 
exclude the application of IHL because such action would not be an “armed conflict.” This 
suggestion is very similar to notions of “measures short of war” that were common as 
                                                                                                                               
 43. If the so-called terrorists are acting on behalf of the State, then they could be combatants if they 
conform to the criteria in Article 4 of Geneva Convention III or Article 43 of Additional Protocol I for 
States party to that treaty. 
 44. See Ray Rivera et al., A New Terror in Afghanistan: Death Squads, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 30, 
2011, at 5. In the case of Afghanistan, death squads kill suspected collaborators, including those 
considered to have given information enabling the choice of targets for drone attacks. 
45.  This general problem is described in the Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism ¶¶ 15, 
20, 22–23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/13 (June 2, 2008). 
 46. E.g. Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
in Combating Terrorism, 1999 art. 1, June 4, 1999, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdfb290.html; Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference on Combating International Terrorism, art. 1, ¶ 2, July 1, 1999, Annex to Resolution No. 
59/26-P, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3de5e6646.html. 
 47. Anderson, supra note 15. 
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justifications for the use of force prior to 1914. As described by Ian Brownlie in his very well 
researched book on the use of force, “war” in the past depended on the intention to be in a 
state of war.48 States that wanted to avoid the rules that were required for “war” argued 
another ground, such as self-defense, self-preservation, necessity or self-help. His analysis 
showed that these grounds were in reality not distinct, were used by States whenever 
convenient, and did not in practice reflect a rule of law.49 Suggestions to go back to such a 
scenario do not fill one with confidence—after all, the first half of the twentieth century was 
not exactly known for its peaceful nature! The 1949 Geneva Conventions specifically apply to 
armed conflicts, whether a state of war is recognized or not,50 precisely to avoid this situation. 
A similar argument to that of Ken Anderson is made by Solon Solomon. He does not 
suggest avoiding IHL altogether, but proposes that actions violating IHL should be acceptable 
if such actions are in keeping with the right of self-defense. Using the example of Gaza, 
Solomon accepts that the economic sanctions that were imposed on Gaza could arguably be 
seen as amounting to “collective punishment,” which is prohibited under IHL, but which 
should be seen as an acceptable self-defense measure that is better than open hostilities.51 
It is unclear which proposal is more troubling—suggesting that IHL doesn’t apply at all, or 
that it does, but that violations should not be considered a problem if the action can be 
justified under self-defense. Both try to avoid IHL because it is perceived as too restrictive. 
Suggesting self-defense as a justification instead presupposes a fairly generous interpretation 
of this term, which is not in keeping with how this has been interpreted by the International 
Court of Justice and traditionally understood within the regime of the U.N. Charter. 
Solomon’s article does, however, unintentionally highlight the problem with the premise 
that force can create security. He recalls that after the disengagement of Israel from Gaza in 
2007, Israel restricted the passage of persons and reduced the supply of electricity and fuel in 
the hope that this would pressure the Palestinians into halting rocket attacks. The policy did 
not have this effect—rather it just increased the degree of resentment of those subjected to 
this treatment. The decades of security measures taken by Israel have not significantly 
improved the situation because the basic problem of self-determination has not been properly 
resolved. 
This leads back to the point that forcible counter-terrorism measures are not the way to 
solve the problem and in reality are more likely to create more resentment and hatred in the 
communities affected by the attacks. Loosening the standards of the U.N. Charter is not the 
way forward. Peacebuilding is hard work, unspectacular, long, and mostly undertaken behind 
the scenes. However, it is the only effective way to achieve peace in the long term. It is also 
achievable—Western Europe after the Second World War attests to this. 
                                                                                                                               
 48. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 38. 
 49. Id. at 41–48. 
 50. See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 9, art. 2. The language in Article 2 is common to all four 
of the Geneva Conventions.  
 51. Solon Solomon, The Great Oxymoron: Jus in Bello Violations as Legitimate Non-Forcible Measures of 
Self-Defense: The Post-Disengagement Israeli Measures towards Gaza as a Case Study, 9 CHINESE J. 
OF INT’L L. 501 (2010). 
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In order to avoid an abusive use of the doctrine of self-defense as a justification for attacks 
on non-State actors in other countries, a group of leading international lawyers in Britain 
undertook an analysis of how the right to self-defense is to be interpreted. The result is a 
document called the “Chatham House Principles,” published in 2005. These principles 
reaffirm the International Court of Justice’s insistence that using force in self-defense can 
only be further to a large-scale attack, and only to the degree required to avert or end this 
attack.52 They also insist that “force may only be used when any further delay would result in 
an inability by the threatened state effectively to defend against or avert the attack against 
it” and that such “force may be used only on a proper factual basis and after a good faith 
assessment of the facts.”53 These Principles make the point that “[t]errorist organisations are 
not easily rooted out by foreign armed forces.”54 
The result of these conditions is that such force will only be legitimate in exceptional cases 
and certainly not as an on-going activity. The correct treatment of such force as an 
international conflict, and not a non-international conflict, will mean that for parties to 
Additional Protocol I, the full range of provisions will apply. Not surprisingly, the Chatham 
House Principles also confirm that forcible action in self-defense “must conform with the rules 
of international humanitarian law governing the conduct of hostilities.”55 
E. IHL Qualification of Attacks on Non-State Actors Abroad 
As far as the qualification of an attack on non-State actors in another country is 
concerned, the first point to be made is that such an attack is a “use of force against the 
territorial integrity” of a State within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.56 
Logically it seems evident that the conflict is an international one. This point is confirmed by 
the definition of aggression in General Assembly Resolution 3314, which is probably going to 
be used for the interpretation of this term in the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.57 That definition includes the “[b]ombardment by the armed forces of a State against 
the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of 
another State.”58 
When I was at the ICRC, such an action was always accepted as reflecting an 
international armed conflict. However, it appears to be the case that many IHL specialists are 
accepting assertions that attacking armed groups in another State is a non-international 
armed conflict because the attack was not aimed at government troops.59 Going along with 
                                                                                                                               
 52. Chatham House Principles, supra note 39.  
 53. Id. princ. 4. 
 54. Id. cmt. to princ. 6. 
 55. Id. princ. 7. 
 56. Id. cmt. to princ. 6. 
 57. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). Following resolution RC/Res.4, adopted on 
June 11, 2010 by parties to the ICC Statute, the crime of aggression was defined by reference to 
G.A. Res. 3314. The new Article 8 bis, containing this definition, will be included in the Statute 
further to a decision in 2017 by parties to the ICC. See The Crime of Aggression, COALITION FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression (last visited Oct. 20, 
2012). 
 58. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 57, Annex at art. 3(b) (Definition of Aggression).  
 59. See id. art. 3(d) (“An attack on the armed forces of [another] State” is another alternative). 
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this thinking is accepting dangerous propaganda that further weakens the rule against the 
use of force. The attack on Lebanon in 2006, for example, which Israel asserted was aimed 
only at Hezbollah, was certainly felt by the government of Lebanon to be an attack on the 
State of Lebanon.60 Drone attacks that occur in Pakistan are certainly felt by the government 
as an attack on the State. The situation of Gaza should be a good illustration of the 
opportunistic classification of attacks on another territory depending on the ends sought. The 
Israeli authorities consistently classified attacks on Hamas in Gaza as attacks on a terrorist 
group. However, in the context of the Palmer Inquiry on the Flotilla incident, Israel justified 
its blockade of Gaza on the basis that it was involved in an international conflict,61 as only in 
such conflicts can blockades be lawfully created. 
A further reason for maintaining the classification as an international armed conflict is 
the reasoning behind the “unwilling or unable” justification for attacks on terrorist groups 
abroad. The commentary to Principle 6 of the Chatham House Principles explains that it 
“may be that the state is not responsible for the acts of terrorists, but it is responsible for any 
failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the use of its territory as a base for attacks on 
other states.”62 This reasoning reinforces the fact that the attack is on the State. 
III. Consideration of Whether IHL Needs to Be Limited to an 
International/Non-International Armed Conflict Dichotomy 
The problem relating to the classification of attacks on non-State actors in other countries 
is just another manifestation of the fundamental problem with the traditional dichotomy of 
international or non-international armed conflict. There are so many mixed conflicts these 
days, as well as those involving the use of force by international organizations such as the 
U.N., that it makes sense to consider whether there could be another alternative. The 
following is not intended to be a magic formula that I have come up with, but rather a 
suggestion of how the issue could be thought about from a different angle. 
Until recently it was fairly clear that there were far fewer rules for non-international 
conflicts and therefore the classification was of great importance. However, when evaluating 
State practice for the purpose of the customary law study,63 it was clear that a major change 
began to take place in the 1990s. States began regularly insisting on basic rules, which were 
then mostly associated with only international armed conflicts, for all types of conflicts. This 
was especially the case regarding the condemnation of attacks on civilians and of 
indiscriminate attacks. As a result, by the beginning of 2002 (the time until which we 
collected material), there was sufficiently dense, widespread, and almost uniform official 
                                                                                                                               
 60. The assertion that this was a non-international armed conflict was even more bizarre given that 
Hezbollah was part of the government and was the accepted local government authority in southern 
Lebanon. 
 61. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 
Flotilla Incident, ¶ 47, (Sept. 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf. 
 62. Chatham House Principles, supra note 39, cmt. to princ. 6. 
 63. 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW (2005). 
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State practice to establish a substantial number of customary rules applicable to both types of 
conflict.64 As States continued to speak of international or non-international conflict, we could 
not avoid such a classification, as the evaluation of customary law was based on practice, and 
we could not invent ideas, however useful such ideas might be. However, this does not 
prevent a consideration of what the situation should or could be. 
There is one major remaining difference in the customary law applicable to the two types 
of conflict; namely, the status of the parties. States are still adamant that rebel groups 
remain liable to prosecution for common crimes associated with their violent activities. This 
lack of POW status for fighters in non-international conflicts is the real reason why many 
States had been reluctant in the past to accept more rules for such conflicts. My experience 
from various negotiations to adopt new treaties in the 1990s made this fact quite clear. As 
long as extensive provisions were adopted to ensure that no status could accrue to rebels, and 
no reason for intervention would result, then States accepted that these treaties applied to 
both international and non-international conflicts.65 
It is evident that combatant immunity (i.e., POW status) for actions not violating IHL 
needs to be maintained and that there is no chance at present of such status for rebel groups. 
Any suggestion for a combined set of rules applicable to any armed conflict needs to address 
this issue squarely. For this purpose, it is useful to consider what the origin of POW status 
was. Initially, it was accorded only to soldiers of an official army. As such, these persons 
belonged to an organ of the State (the army being part of the executive). Immunity from 
prosecution for such military personnel was, and still is, the normal result of sovereign 
immunity from prosecution for violation of national crimes of another State. This rationale 
could be maintained to ensure immunity from prosecution for those representing a State, but 
not for other individuals. With regard to some of the other categories of persons that have 
been accorded POW status since 1899, we could consider groups or individuals fighting for 
the State and with the approval of that State as exercising the functions of the State, as 
described in Article 5,66 or even Article 11,67 of the Articles on State Responsibility.68 
Although the Articles on State Responsibility relate to State responsibility for unlawful acts, 
                                                                                                                               
 64. If the study had been published a decade earlier, based on practice up until 1992, the result would 
have been very different, with far fewer rules also applicable to non-international conflicts. 
 65. See, e.g., Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 art. 1, 35 I.L.M. 1206 (1980 Convention Protocol II as 
amended); Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 22, Mar. 26, 1999, UNESCO Doc. HC/1999/7. Since then, new 
weapons treaties apply at all times. 
 66. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Rep. of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, 53d Sess, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 44 (2001) (“The 
conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State . . . but which is empowered by the 
law of the State to exercise elements of governmental authority shall be considered an act of the 
State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the 
particular instance.”).  
 67. Id. at 45 (“Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall 
nevertheless be considered an act of State under international law if and to the extent that the State 
acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.”). 
 68. See also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (2003), which includes the full 
commentary to the articles. 
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and not sovereign immunity, the immunities accorded by States are not immutable. They are, 
for example, extended to persons acting for an international organization. It is just a 
question, therefore, of international agreement as to which persons or groups should benefit 
from this immunity. The fact that a government or State may not be recognized by another 
belligerent party would not make a difference to this so that the effect of Article 4(3) of the 
Third Geneva Convention69 would not be altered. With regard to some of the other civilian 
personnel included in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, in particular paragraph 5, it 
may well be that POW status is not particularly attractive. After all, this status entitles the 
other belligerent State to intern such persons for the whole length of the conflict, which could 
be decades. The lack of human rights law in 1949 meant that POW status provided some 
security that was otherwise missing. This is not necessarily the case now. Indeed, as far as 
treatment is concerned, the provisions in the Geneva Conventions for all internees have since 
been largely provided by various international human rights instruments. This is important 
as paragraph 5 of Article 4 only provides for POW status for persons “who do not benefit by 
more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law.”70 
As not all States are yet party to all the relevant human rights treaties, whereas all are 
party to the Geneva Conventions, I am not suggesting that the protections of the Geneva 
Conventions are now irrelevant. Rather, I propose that all the rules that have been identified 
as customary for both international and non-international conflicts apply to all types of 
conflicts. Other protective rules applicable only to international conflicts should remain for 
such conflicts in order to avoiding losing what is presently still important. The special rules 
for combatant immunity for those acting on behalf of the State will remain as a manifestation 
of sovereign immunity. 
It needs to be remembered that the application of IHL confers not only protective rules, 
but also the entitlement to use force against fighters or, to be more accurate, recognition that 
such use of force would not be a violation of IHL. This fact means that the application of IHL 
is not necessarily to be advised in all situations of violence. This is why the threshold for non-
international conflicts remains high, and also why the threshold for the use of force against 
non-State actors in self-defense needs to remain high. In fact, the scenarios described in the 
definition of aggression in Article 3 of Resolution 331471 would not be a bad basis for the 
                                                                                                                               
 69. Geneva Convention III, supra note 9.  
 70. Id. art. 4. 
 71. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 57, Annex (listing the following scenarios as qualifying as acts of 
aggression: “(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation;” “(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the 
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another 
State; (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; (d) An 
attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of 
another State; (e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another 
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in 
the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the 
agreement; (f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of 
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third 
State; (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts 
listed above.”). 
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evaluation of the existence of an armed conflict for any cross-border activity, although it 
would need to include action also by an international organization and not only by a State. 
Activities by non-State actors need to meet the existing threshold, and IHL should not apply 
to the problem of criminal activity having no political agenda whatsoever,72 as this could 
imply the possibility to engage in an excessively dangerous use of force. 
IV. Practical Importance of Human Rights Law to Ensure 
Implementation of IHL 
As a result of studies undertaken in the human rights context, for example, reports by 
U.N. Special Rapporteurs, observations by human rights treaty bodies, and various fact-
finding reports, it has become increasingly evident that many serious violations of IHL occur 
because of disrespect for human rights in the countries concerned before the conflict. This is 
particularly true of the non-discrimination rule that is valid for IHL and human rights, as 
well as those individual economic, social and civil rights which are common to both bodies of 
law. Additionally, freedom of expression, not provided for as such in IHL, is in practice 
important to ensure the implementation of IHL. The following will only touch on just a few 
aspects that illustrate this problem. 
A. Non-Discrimination 
The requirement to respect IHL without discrimination can be subject to an almost 
insurmountable hurdle when the conflict itself is based on ethnic discrimination. The murder 
and displacement of civilians associated with so-called “ethnic cleansing” is the most obvious 
manifestation of this. However, inherent negative attitudes towards certain parts of the 
population will make the respect of almost all IHL rules that much more difficult or even 
impossible.73 
The problem with discrimination is that it is the product of attitudes passed from one 
generation to another and so firmly absorbed into the mentality of people that they may not 
even be aware of how biased they are. Even if the official law appears neutral, assumptions 
absorbed from childhood can prevent genuine equality in practice. This is normally referred 
                                                                                                                               
 72. Although a political agenda is not a criterion mentioned in any of the treaties or case law defining a 
non-international conflict, in practice it has always been implied. The ICRC Commentary to Article 
3 confirms that States did not intend the expression “Party to a conflict” to include “common 
brigands” or mere “felons.” See COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 11, at 32. A 
study of situations classified as armed conflicts has shown that States insist on the respect of both 
human rights law and international humanitarian law in situations where the rebels have a 
political agenda. See, e.g., Ilia Siatitsa & Maia Titberidze, Human Rights in Armed Conflict from the 
Perspective of the Contemporary State Practice in the United Nations: Factual Answers to Certain 
Hypothetical Challenges, UNGA, UNSC, HRC, and CHR addenda (ADH Research Paper, 2011), 
available at http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/international_human_rights_law.php. 
 73. For references to the inherent problems of disadvantaged minorities and indigenous peoples, see 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Concluding Observations: Chad, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/TCD/CO/3 (Dec. 16, 2009) [hereinafter CESCR Chad]; CESCR, Concluding Observations: 
Democratic Republic of the Congo ¶¶ 15, 17, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/COD/CO/4 (Dec. 16, 2009) 
[hereinafter CESCR DRC]; and CESCR, Concluding Observations: Doc. Submitted by the U.N. 
Interim Admin. Mission in Kosovo, ¶¶ 15, 17–18, 21–22, 32, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/UNK/CO/1 (Dec. 1, 
2008) [hereinafter CESCR UNMIK].  
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to as “indirect discrimination,” which is particularly prevalent in the economic and social 
sphere and has become very clear in the context of gender discrimination.74 Unfortunately, 
the issue of gender discrimination has been seen as marginal in the past, and in many places 
still is. This is a fundamental error. Quite apart from the injustice of this approach, it has 
become clear, including by a World Bank study,75 that gender discrimination is the most 
important reason for the lack of development and poverty of many societies. This in turn can 
frequently lead to conflict, thereby further exacerbating economic problems, and indeed 
creating a vicious circle. 
IHL rules concentrate on the prohibition of rape and other sexual violence, as well as the 
care of maternity cases. Not only is this rather a narrow approach, but these rules are not 
respected because of gender discrimination. Studies have shown that pre-existing attitudes 
contribute to such violations. As noted in the U.N. Secretary-General’s Report on Women, 
Peace and Security: “Where cultures of violence and discrimination against women and girls 
exist prior to conflict, they will be exacerbated during conflict.”76 In turn, such behavior is 
based on long-term attitudes relating to the status of women: 
Violence against women throughout the life cycle derives essentially from cultural 
patterns, in particular the harmful effects of certain traditional or customary practices 
and all acts of extremism linked to race, sex, language or religion that perpetuate the 
lower status accorded to women in the family, the workplace, the community and 
society.77 
                                                                                                                               
 74. The meaning of “gender” and “gender inequality” is well described in General Comment 16 of the 
CESCR:  
Gender refers to cultural expectations and assumptions about the behaviour, attitudes, 
personality traits, and physical and intellectual capacities of men and women, based solely 
on their identity as men or women. Gender-based assumptions and expectations generally 
place women at a disadvantage with respect to substantive enjoyment of rights, such as 
freedom to act and to be recognized as autonomous, fully capable adults, to participate fully 
in economic, social and political development, and to make decisions concerning their 
circumstances and conditions. Gender-based assumptions about economic, social and 
cultural roles preclude the sharing of responsibility between men and women in all spheres 
that is necessary to equality. 
 CESCR, General Comment No. 16 on the Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 34th Sess., Apr. 25–May 13, 2005, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2005/4 (Aug. 11, 2005). The same General Comment notes this lack of equality in relation to 
many rights, concluding that “[w]omen are often denied equal enjoyment of their human rights . . . 
by virtue of the lesser status ascribed to them by tradition and custom, or as a result of overt or 
covert discrimination.” Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
 75. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH REPORT: ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT—THROUGH 
GENDER EQUALITY IN RIGHTS, RESOURCES AND VOICE (2001).  
 76. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security, ¶ 5, U.N. 
Doc. S/2002/1154 (Oct. 16, 2002) [hereinafter SG Report]. 
 77. Rep. of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4–15, 1995, ¶ 118, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.177/20 (Oct. 17, 1995). See also Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes 
and Consequences, Rep. on Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: 
Violence against Women in Accordance with Comm’n on Human Rights Resolution 2000/45, 
Violence against Women Perpetrated and/or Condoned by the State During Times of Armed Conflict 
(1997–2000), Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73 (Jan. 23, 2001) (by Radhika 
Coomaraswamy) for a thorough study on the causes and consequences of violence against women.  
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The result of this is that violence in peacetime is rarely addressed or punished, often being 
seen as a private affair, or even justifiable.78 Not surprisingly, against such a background, 
such violence multiplies with impunity during the chaos and stress of armed conflict. 
The same discrimination creates disproportionate economic hardship for women and 
prevents them from receiving appropriate humanitarian aid. The U.N. Secretary-General’s 
report explains that gender inequality creates particular stress during armed conflict: 
 With the loss of men and boys . . . through participation in armed forces, detention or 
disappearance, women and girls are forced to take on more responsibility for family 
security and well-being, often without the necessary resources or social support. Lack of 
land and property rights and lack of access to, or control over, resources threaten 
women’s livelihoods.79 
As far as humanitarian aid is concerned, it has been pointed out that: 
 A significant proportion of official and non-governmental aid fails to reach women 
survivors. Almost invariably, men are placed in charge of the decision-making process 
regarding humanitarian assistance and its distribution, despite the fact that women 
are generally far more experienced in food production, distribution, and preparation 
than men. Consequently, women are frequently disadvantaged, either deliberately or 
because their needs are not properly understood.80 
The point relating to food is equally relevant for medical and hygiene supplies. The U.N. 
Secretary-General’s report therefore recommends that women be fully involved in the 
management of camps and in decision-making.81 
The link between gender inequality and violence, including in armed conflict, is recognized 
in a number of Concluding Observations of the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights,82 as well as treaties dedicated to the problem of violence against women.83 
                                                                                                                               
 78. For examples of such behavior described in two human rights cases, see Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 
33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. Judgment (June 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a2f84392.html; and González et al. v. Mexico, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 16 , 2009), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_205_ing.pdf. 
 79. SG Report, supra note 76, ¶ 9. 
 80. Judith Gardam & Hilary Charlesworth, Protection of Women in Armed Conflict, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 
148, 154–55 (2000) (citations omitted). See also CHARLOTTE LINDSEY, WOMEN FACING WAR: ICRC 
STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON WOMEN 41, 88, 124 (2001) (addressing some of the 
same points). 
 81. SG Report, supra note 76, ¶ 51. See also id. ¶ 29 (describing the need for women’s involvement in 
peace operations); S.C. Res. 1889, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889 (Oct. 5, 2009) (describing the need for 
greater empowerment of women and practical measures to this effect). 
 82. CESCR Chad, supra note 73; CESCR DRC, supra note 73; CESCR UNMIK, supra note 73; CESCR, 
Concluding Observations: Colombia, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/COL/CO/5 (June 7, 2010); CESCR, 
Concluding Observations: Afghanistan, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/AFG/CO/2-4 (June 7, 2010). 
 83. Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment 
and Eradication of Violence against Women arts. 6, 9, Jun. 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534; Council of 
Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, 
pmbl. ¶ 10, art. 2, Nov. 5, 2011, C.E.T.S. No. 210. Both treaties provide for measures to change 
attitudes and to ensure greater diligence in pursuing perpetrators of such violence. 
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B. Exploitation of Children 
Attitudes toward children contribute to their exploitation in wartime. Displacement is 
particularly dangerous for them. Machel’s report summed it up as follows: “At least half of all 
refugees and displaced people are children. . . . In the course of displacement, millions of 
children have been separated from their families, physically abused, exploited and abducted 
into military groups, or they have perished from hunger and disease.”84 
Sexual exploitation of girls, and also some boys, takes advantage of their legal and 
practical vulnerability. Armed groups are also able to recruit children because of the 
children’s poverty.85 Abuses against children show that no allowance is made for their age.86 
Attitudes, especially for recruited girls, make reintegration into their families and 
communities difficult, or even impossible.87 The resulting psychological trauma of the 
younger generation may well lead to abuses by them in later conflicts. 
C. Treatment of Wounded 
This is, of course, a very basic rule of IHL, dating back to the First Geneva Convention of 
1864, with various developments culminating in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its three 
Protocols. The human rights equivalent is the right to life, which includes positive obligations 
to protect life,88 as well as the right to the highest attainable standard of health.89 
Withholding necessary medical treatment also amounts to “inhuman treatment.”90 However, 
during the Arab Spring unrest, there have been reports of doctors and nurses being arrested 
and convicted to long prison sentences for treating wounded demonstrators.91 This kind of 
attitude could well be repeated in time of armed conflict. 
                                                                                                                               
 84. Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, ¶ 66, U.N. 
Doc. A/51/306, (Aug. 26, 1996) (Graça Machel). 
 85. Id. ¶¶ 38–48. 
 86. See S.C. Res. 1539, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1539 (Apr. 22, 2004) (condemning the serious abuses 
committed against children in armed conflict).  
 87. See, e.g., U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND, THE PARIS PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON CHILDREN 
ASSOCIATED WITH ARMED FORCES OR ARMED GROUPS ¶¶ 7.30–7.34, 7.37–7.43, 7.59–7.67 (2007), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/465198442.pdf.  
 88. All the human rights treaty bodies have interpreted the right to life as including such positive 
measures. With regard to treating the wounded during armed conflict, see, e.g., Ahmed Özkan and 
Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 307–08 (2004); Varnava and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
¶ 185 (2009); Neira Alegria et al. v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 20, ¶ 74 (Jan. 19, 
1995).  
 89. See Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. See 
also CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (2000) ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) (noting 
that withholding medical treatment from particular individuals or groups is an egregious violation 
of the duty to respect this right).  
 90. See Huri-Laws v. Nigeria, African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communications 
Decisions 225/98 ¶ 41 (2000); Istratii and Others v. Moldova, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 46–58 (2007); 
Montero-Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, ¶¶ 101–03 (July 5, 2006).  
 91. See J. David Goodman, Bahrain Court Hands Down Harsh Sentences to Doctors and Protestors, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/world/middleeast/bahrain-court-hands-
down-harsh-sentences-to-doctors-and-protesters.html?_r=1&scp=5&sq= 
%E2%80%9CDoctors+get+prison+terms+in+Bahrain+over+unrest%E2%80%9D&st=nyt. 
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D. Disrespect for Civil Rights 
The stress created by armed conflict means that it is difficult to maintain certain 
standards during this time. There is a temptation, as we have seen in many instances, 
including actions after 9/11, to believe that such standards should be dropped in the face of 
emergency. There is, therefore, the need to reinforce the compulsory character of many of 
these rights, such as the prohibition of torture, the right to a fair trial and the compulsory 
registration of detainees to prevent disappearance. The Geneva Conventions are crucially 
important to stress that these standards must be maintained, and to provide mechanisms to 
help this. 
However, what is less talked of is the fact that such standards cannot be implemented in 
armed conflict if they were not respected prior to the outbreak of armed conflict. The following 
sections provide examples to illustrate. 
1. Prohibition of Torture 
Unfortunately, in many countries it is standard procedure to base criminal convictions on 
confessions. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment describes the implications of this as follows: 
It is self-evident that a criminal justice system which places a premium on confession 
evidence creates incentives for officials involved in the investigation of crime—and often 
under pressure to obtain results—to use physical or psychological coercion. . . . [I]t is of 
fundamental importance to develop methods of crime investigation capable of reducing 
reliance on confessions . . . .92 
It is evident that the other methods of investigation referred to here include the analysis of 
objective data such as forensic evidence. It is highly unlikely that countries that rely 
primarily or entirely on forcing confessions will suddenly become proficient in the collection 
and analysis of other data once an armed conflict breaks out. 
In addition, human rights studies have proved that the most dangerous time for a 
detained person is the first hours after capture. Therefore human rights bodies have 
established ways that help prevent torture: the insistence on the presence of a lawyer from 
the outset and during any interrogation,93 the recording of interrogations,94 and access to a 
                                                                                                                               
 92. The European Comm. for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT), 12th General Report on the CPT’s Activities, ¶ 35, (2002).  
 93. See, e.g., id. ¶ 41; CPT, 6th General Report, ¶ 35, (1996); Human Rights Council, Resolution 13/19 
on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: the Role and 
Responsibility of Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/13/19 ¶¶ 5, 6 (Apr. 15, 
2010) [hereinafter HRC Res. 13/19]; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 Annex at princ. 17 
(Dec. 9, 1988) [hereinafter U.N. Body of Principles on Detention]; Comm. of Ministers, 
Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European 
Prison Rules, ¶ 98, (Jan. 11, 2006) (EC); Salduz v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 54, (2008), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-89893; African Comm. on Human and 
People’s Rights (ACHPR), Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and 
Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa, Res. 61, ¶ 
20(c) (2002) [hereinafter Afr. Comm. Res. 61]; Inter-Am. Comm. on Human Rights, Report on 
Terrorism and Human Rights, ¶ 237, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116 (Oct. 22, 2002).  
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doctor on arrival and thereafter whenever requested.95 If these measures are not a habit in 
peacetime, they will hardly be implemented in wartime. Unfortunately, IHL does not require 
these measures expressly, but IHL specialists should be aware that they are necessary to 
prevent torture. 
2. Prohibition of Enforced Disappearance 
Although this prohibition is not articulated in IHL treaty law as such, it is clearly 
prohibited because it amounts to a combination of other violations, in particular, murder, lack 
of registration of prisoners, incommunicado detention, probably torture, and lack of any 
procedural rights. In this regard, IHL treaty law applicable to international conflicts is better 
than that for non-international conflicts. However, once again, if the conditions that favor 
enforced disappearance are present in peacetime situations, then the likelihood of occurrences 
during armed conflict is that much greater. The International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICED) lists the main measures that are 
required to help prevent this phenomenon. These are a distillation of relevant existing treaty 
law, together with its interpretation by caselaw. The measures include the requirement to 
keep detained persons in officially-recognized and supervised centers, the keeping of detailed 
official registers, the right for a detainee to communicate with family, lawyer and, if a 
foreigner, consular authorities, and the right to take proceedings to establish the lawfulness 
of detention by the detained person or his family.96 An absence of these in peacetime does not 
bode well for detained persons in wartime. 
3. Right to Fair Trial 
The right to fair trial is not only provided for by Common Article 3, but also in more detail 
in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 Additional Protocols. 
Ensuring a fair trial necessitates not only the fundamental element of an independent and 
impartial tribunal, but also a host of other attributes that will ensure equality of arms 
between the parties concerned. This requires an effective defense that includes proper access 
to documents, reliable evidence and the means to counter prosecution arguments. The 
prohibition on using evidence obtained by torture is part of this requirement.97 All this 
involves a sophisticated apparatus that cannot exist without extensive prior training and 
mechanisms in place. Most crucially, it requires a mentality that recognizes the principle of 
innocence until proved guilty through fair procedures. This was recognized in 1949 through 
                                                                                                                               
 94. See CPT, 12th General Report, supra note 92, ¶ 36; G.A. Res. 43/173, supra note 93; U.N. Human 
Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (Mar. 10, 1992). 
 95. See, e.g., HRC Res. 13/19, supra note 93, ¶ 5; CPT, 12th General Report, supra note 92, ¶ 42; U.N. 
Body of Principles on Detention, supra note 93, Annex at princ. 24; Afr. Comm. Res. 61, supra note 
93, ¶ 20(b). 
 96. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. 
Res. 61/177, Annex at art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Jan. 12, 2007). See also DOSWALD-BECK, 
supra note 34, §§ 6.4, 6.6, 7.5, 8–9 (2011).  
 97. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 
15, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
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the wording of Common Article 3 which required judgments to be pronounced by a “regularly 
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
by civilized peoples.”98 The last words have since been dropped because of their offensive 
connotation, but the original meaning, namely, the level of sophistication required, does 
reflect what a fair trial requires.99 
Unfortunately, a myriad of cases brought before international human rights treaty bodies 
have shown the degree to which this right has not been properly respected. This is 
particularly the case where there is insufficient separation between the judicial and executive 
branches of government. Once again, such shortfalls are hardly going to be remedied during 
an armed conflict. 
4. Right to Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of Expression includes the right to not only impart information but also to receive 
it.100 This is a human right that is clearly absent in IHL as such, and yet several aspects of 
IHL implementation would be difficult to achieve without it. 
The most obvious point is that IHL requires governments to disseminate its provisions not 
only to the army but also, as far as possible, to the civilian population.101 This clearly implies 
a right to receive such information. 
More significantly, the required repression of IHL violations cannot take place in most 
cases without the ability to report on suspected violations. This is clearly the case within the 
army where a commander would need to be informed by someone if a violation is being or had 
been committed.102 The required refusal to carry out a manifestly unlawful act also implies 
that the soldier at the receiving end of the order has the right to express this.103 However, the 
issue is not limited to the army. Information on war crimes is often uncovered by 
investigative journalists and who must be able to publish that information if war crimes are 
to be punished and their repetition avoided. A case to this effect came before the European 
                                                                                                                               
98.  Art. 3 (1)(d) of all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
 99. For an interpretation of the principle of legality and the right to fair trial, including international 
caselaw, see DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 34, chs. 11, 12, 13; WALTER KÄLIN & JÖRG KÜNZLI, THE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION 450–63 (2009); RHONA K. M. SMITH, TEXTBOOK 
ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, ch. 16 (4th ed. 2010). For a practical explanation, see INT’L 
COMM’N OF JURISTS, TRIAL OBSERVATION MANUAL FOR CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2009). 
 100. This is spelled out in several treaties: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 
19(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; American Convention on Human Rights art. 13(1), Nov. 21, 
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; European Human Rights Convention art. 10(1), Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights art. 9, June 27, 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human 
Rights art. 32, Sept. 15, 1994.  
 101. See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 9, arts. 41, 127; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 144, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 19, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609.  
 102. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) arts. 86, 87, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 103. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 33, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
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Court of Human Rights in which a journalist from Azerbaijan was convicted for publishing 
information showing that some war crimes were committed by its own soldiers. Freedom of 
expression, like the other human rights freedoms, are subject to possible limitations in 
national law provided that they are genuinely necessary and proportionate to the aim 
required, such as national security. This was not the case in this instance. As the European 
Court said: “it is essential in a democratic society that a debate on the causes of acts of 
particular gravity which may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity should be 
able to take place freely.”104 An atmosphere of repression during peacetime is likely to 
continue, and indeed get worse, during wartime. 
E. What Should IHL Specialists Make of this Information? 
The first point, I think, is for IHL specialists to feel less apologetic about the violations 
that do occur, given that many of these stem from conditions beforehand. I am not one of 
those that believe that IHL is almost always violated, as conformity with the rules often 
means the abstention from certain actions. However, it is best to be clear about why there is 
so much difficulty in ensuring the respect of many rules, at least in the context of a number of 
armed conflicts. A novel approach could be, therefore, that where rules of IHL and human 
rights law are the same, efforts to respect human rights law in peacetime may be seen as 
preparation for a proper respect of IHL. This is because, as stressed above, many IHL 
requirements cannot be created overnight, but need to be embedded in the culture and long-
term practice of a society at all times. 
In cases where human rights law is not reflected in rules of IHL directly, it would be wise 
to recognize the value of human rights in order to help enforce IHL. This includes, for 
example, logical deductions made by human rights bodies, such as the need to investigate 
possible violations of the right to life, which is not spelled out in human rights treaties, but 
which makes sense to ensure its implementation. All this reinforces the need to ensure 
respect for both human rights and IHL. Arguments that one can function well without the 
other do not stand up. 
V. Conclusion 
The effect of armed measures on non-governmental actors based abroad, and the 
increasing availability of armed drones, means that international law is facing a fundamental 
choice. The bottom line is whether we want to create a world that is more peaceful or more 
violent. No one can deny the right of a country to defend itself against invasion or serious 
attack. However, in order to avoid a culture of using force to try to solve problems, which it 
cannot, it is the responsibility of international lawyers to remind the world of what post-
Charter international law was supposed to be about, namely, the creation of international 
peace and security. This is still the aim that needs to be worked toward. The world is now so 
much more interconnected than in 1945 that it has helped the spread of international 
                                                                                                                               
 104. Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, Eur. Ct. H.R, Judgment, (2010), ¶¶ 87, 102–03, 116, available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-98401. 
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terrorist activity. By the same token, however, our present day inter-dependency means that 
it is not viable to go back to nineteenth century modalities on the use of force. Unfortunately, 
violence usually creates more violence, together with social and economic upheaval. 
IHL is only meant to be a stop-gap to prevent the total descent into absolute barbarism 
and destruction. Ideally, it should not be necessary at all. At the moment it is much more 
present than it ought to be. By that I mean that far more armed force is being used than 
should be the case. Too many internal conflicts are being created by social unrest through an 
insufficient genuine desire to respect human rights. What I am trying to say here is that IHL 
specialists should not imagine that this branch of international law can exist and be properly 
implemented without reference to other branches of international law. A lack of a human 
rights culture will in practice prevent the proper respect of IHL. A lack of genuine belief in 
the need to prevent inter-State force motivates States to justify such force on the basis that 
there is a non-international conflict. When a State attacks the territory of another it has 
created an international conflict. Non-recognition of this fact merely plays into the hands of 
those wishing to weaken the rules preventing inter-State force. 
IHL faces many challenges and difficulties, and unfortunately, others are likely to develop 
in the future. I would encourage lawyers not to be so blinded by dogmas that they forget what 
the original reasons for certain rules were. An example of this is the rigid distinction between 
international and non-international conflict, and the supposed equality of the parties in the 
latter. This needs honest re-examination. Whatever the challenge, it is crucial to keep in 
mind what the law is ultimately trying to achieve. On this basis I hope that international 
lawyers can courageously defend the fundamental aim of peace and human dignity and what 
is required to this end. 
  
